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Decarbonizing the boardroom? Aligning Electric Utility Executive Compensation with Climate
Change Incentives.
Abstract
Despite the recent drastic reversal of decarbonization effort by the current Presidential administration,
the majority of U.S. states continue policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and
increasing  renewable energy technology (RET)  deployment.  Although electrical  power  utilities  are
required and/or encouraged to comply with these policies, their executives lack direct incentives to do
so.  In this study, a novel incentive mechanism is evaluated for specifically aligning electric utility
executive  compensation  with  RET declining  costs,  renewable  portfolio  standards  adopted  by  the
majority  of  U.S.  states,  and  global  environmental  goals.  First,  an  overview  is  provided  on  chief
executive  officer  (CEO) pay and the  GHG emissions.   The relationship  between GHG emissions,
renewable energy diversification, and CEO pay is examined using the case study of three of the large
electric  utilities in Michigan. The results  show that the regulated utility market is  not consistently
rewarding CEOs with higher compensation for decreasing GHG emissions and that both an approach
incentivizing  RETs  adoption  and  an  approach  encouraging  GHG  emissions  have  deficiencies.   A
combined  approach  is  then  analyzed  that  results  in  a  compensation  equation  allowing  for  utility
executives to receive incentive pay for reducing overall emissions and increasing renewable generation.
The results indicate that by careful calibration of the proposed incentive equations the harmful effects
of emissions can be prevented through CEO incentive pay.  
Keywords: CEO Compensation; Electric Utility; Emissions; Executive Compensation; 
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1. Introduction
The infancy of the current U.S. Presidential administration has been marked by stark reversal of several
federal  decarbonization  initiatives  (Kormann,  2017;  The White  House,  2017).  However,  as  energy
policy expert Kathryn Hamilton observed, the Trump administration’s actions “can’t change the facts of
climate change. It is happening whether or not they say it's happening.” (GTM Squared, 2017). Both
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Pizer, 2002; Garnett, 2009; Tilman, et al., 2011) and carbon dioxide
(CO2) levels are increasing rapidly on a global scale (Boden, et al., 1994; Riebesell, et al., 2000; Peters
& Hertwich, 2008). This has led to climate change with significant, well established negative effects on
natural and socio-economic systems (Stern, 2006; Moss, et al., 2010).  These negative effects1 are due
to human activity, primarily through the combustion of fossil fuels, which have been increasing global
temperatures from 1951 through 2010, and have been proven with a confidence of 95% (IPCC, 2013;
UN, 2014).
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has determined that electric utilities are the
main source of GHG and CO2 emissions in the United States (Soytas, et al., 2007; EPA, 2016). In the
U.S.,  electricity  generation accounts  for  31% of  GHG emissions;  globally,  it  accounts for  25% of
emissions  (EPA, 2016).  Numerous  studies  indicate  that  these GHG emissions  may be a  source  of
economic liability for electric utilities, which has the potential to significantly impact their financial
viability  and returns  for  shareholders  (Allen,  2003;  Kunreuther  & Michel-Kerjan,  2007;  Faure,  &
Nollkaemper, 2007; Heidari & Pearce, 2016). Addressing this issue through reductions of emissions
and increases in renewable energy technologies (RET) will help reduce the issue of climate change
directly (Tsoutsos, et al., 2008) and limit the potential liability for utilities (Heidari & Pearce,  2016).
The  radical  departure  of  the  current  presidential  administration  from  past  environmentally-centric
federal energy policies is unlikely to reverse the global trend of decarbonization in the electrical power
sector and therefore absolve GHG emitters of the aforementioned liability. Due to significant gains in
efficiency and cost competitiveness, RETs are gaining grid parity (achieving similar or lower prices
than conventional generation) throughout the United States (U.S. EIA, 2017). For example, 2016 saw
solar photovoltaic (PV) system costs drop by 20%, which contributed to solar technology becoming the
leading source of new electric power generating capacity in the United States (Obama, 2017; GTM,
2016).  Another  reason for the irreversible momentum is state  policies  aimed at  combating climate
change.  Renewable  Portfolio  Standards  (RPS)  that  require  utilities  to  supply  a  set  percentage  of
electricity from renewable sources have been an important policy tool of the decarbonization effort by
1These effects include: higher temperatures with heat waves resulting in death by hyperthermia (Dhainaut, et al., 2004;
Poumadre, 2005; Fouillet, et al., 2006), crop failure and global hunger (Parry, et al., 2004; Parry, et al., 2005; Schmidhuber
& Tubiello, 2007; D’Amato & Cecchi, 2008; Gislason & Gorsky, 2010), power outages (Klinenberg, 2008; Vine, 2012), sea
level rise (Moorhead & Brinson, 1995; Frihy, 2003), erosion (Moorhead & Brinson, 1995; Frihy, 2003), higher risk of
flooding and saltwater intrusion (Nicholls, et al., 1999; Bobba, 2002; Frihy, 2003), strong, damaging storms (Dale, et al.,
2001; Desantis, et al., 2007; Allen, et al., 2010; Carnicer, et al., 2011), drought (Dai, 2016), and fire (Amiro, et al., 2001;
Dale, et al., 2001; Flannigan, et al., 2009).
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individual states (National Conference of State Legislators, 2016). Currently 29 states, Washington,
D.C., and three territories have adopted an RPS (National Conference of State Legislators, 2016). The
reversal of the federal decarbonization policies is yet to have a significant effect on states’ renewable
energy policies, including RPSs. Moreover, several states are in the process or have raised their RPS
goals since November 8, 2016. Among these states is Michigan that elevated its RPS goals from 10%
in 2015 to 15% by 2021 (Act. No. 342, 2016; MPSC, 2017). In addition, the implementing legislation,
titled the “Clean, Renewable and Efficient Energy Act” (Act 342) set an ambitious albeit non-binding
goal of not less than 35% of the “state’s electric needs to be met through a combination of energy waste
reduction and renewable energy by 2025”.
In Michigan, Act 342 creates a path for electric utilities towards renewable low-carbon energy sources
and away from fossil fuels. Whether Michigan electric utilities will succeed at adopting this path will in
large  part  depend  on  the  efforts  of  their  top  executives--directors  and  officers--including  chief
executive  officers  (CEOs).  Traditionally,  CEO  compensation  has  included  a  fair  number  of
performance incentives. Yet rarely have these incentives emanated from public environmental goals
(Jin, 2002). Generally, companies that are subject to government rate setting, such as electric utilities,
have  lower  CEO pay (Palia,  2000).  Restricting  the  scope of  a  CEO incentives  package  can  have
unintended  negative  consequences  (Dittmann,  et  al.,  2011).  Because  CEOs  are  driven  largely  by
personal financial gain, they are likely to focus on maximizing sales (Boyes & Schlagenhauf, 1979;
Hirschey & Pappas, 1981; Tosi, et al., 2000). Therefore, in a U.S. state where utility profits are not
meaningfully decoupled from volumetric sales of energy, a utility CEO is likely prioritize increasing
such volumetric sales of energy the vast majority of which comes from fossil fuel-powered generation
sources (IEA, 2015). In the case of Michigan, this effectively creates a conflict between the binding and
non-binding goals set by the state for electric utilities and the personal goals pursued by their CEOs. 
Appropriate executive incentives designed to encourage transitioning to a lower carbon energy mix are
likely to play a significant role in diverting electric utilities from the current fossil-fuel path. In this
study, we propose a novel mechanism that aligns electric utility executive compensation with the state
regulatory decarbonization requirements akin to those of Act 342, as well as global climate change
mitigation goals. First, we provide a rationale for the proposed mechanism. In particular, we outline the
environmental and socio-economic benefits of incorporating renewable energy into an electric utility’s
generation mix and employ the agency conflict and path dependence theories to lay out our theoretical
foundation.  Second,  we provide  an  overview of  our  case  study and then  outline  and analyze  the
aforementioned mechanism using RET and GHG emissions goals for determining CEO pay in order to
see if current compensation is in line with RPS requirements and global climate change mitigation
goals.  We conclude  with  observations  on  the  potential  effectiveness  of  these  novel  compensation
systems.
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2. Background and Conceptual Framework
2.1. Comprehensive Benefits of Renewable Energy Technologies
Historically,  environmental  benefits,  including  climate  change  mitigation,  have  served  as  primary
reasons for RETs adoption (El-Fadel, et al., 2003; Sims, 2004; Granovskii, et al., 2007; Longo, et al.,
2008;  Tsoutsos,  et  al.,  2008).  RETs  environmental  benefits  extend  well  beyond  climate  change
mitigation and include improving public health (Rabl & Spadaro, 2000; Martinot & Chaurey, 2002;
Haines,  et  al.,  2006; Prehoda & Pearce,  2017) and overall  environmental sustainability (Demirbas,
2005; Kishore, et al., 2006; Babypriya, et al., 2009, US EPA Renewable, 2016). Accordingly, Davis, et
al. (2010) estimates that 30 TW of renewable generation will be needed by 2050 to curtail all GHG
emissions in the electric power sector. Thus, the generation from these technologies is predicted to
increase heavily in the near and long-term future (Davis, et al., 2010; Nehrir, et al., 2011; Aslani &
Wong, 2014).2 
Until recently, the economic case for RETs had been built on less direct grounds, such as mitigation of
substantial long-term costs on society (Stern, 2006; Mendelsohn, 2007). Yet the drop in the cost of RET
generation in the last decade has moved the technologies into competitive economic range of fossil
fuels in many regions (Branker, et al., 2011; RFE, 2016; IRENA, 2016; Sandu, et al., 2010). As noted
above, solar PV as one of the most technologically promising technologies (Pearce, 2002), has also
demonstrated great economic promise due to rapid cost decline along with rapid expansion (Obama,
2017;  GTM,  2016;  Movellan,  2016).  Other  commercialized  RETs  have  shown  similar  promise
(Branker, et al., 2011; RFE, 2016; Sandu, et al., 2010).  The U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA), lists pre-tax credit levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for new geothermal generation entering
service in 2022 at 46.5 $/MWh (EIA, 2017). In comparison, the EIA (2017) lists the costs of natural
gas-fired conventional combined cycle at 57.3 $/MWh, natural gas-fired advanced combined cycle at
56.5 $/MWh, and advanced nuclear at 99.1 $/MWh. Remarkably, EIA’s 2017 outlook does not contain
any data on coal-fired power plants without carbon capture and sequestration (CSS), indicating that the
agency does not see any of them entering service by 2022. The LCOE numbers on coal-fired generation
with CSS are not promising either as they are roughly triple those of geothermal (EIA, 2017).
The environmental and societal case, including higher than fossil fuel jobs per-unit of energy ratio
(Martinot & Chaurey, 2002; Geller,  et  al.,  2004; Haines, et  al.,  2009; Wei,  et  al.,  2010), has been
strengthened by the business case for RETs. RETs are becoming less expensive whereas fossil fuels are
moving in the opposite direction (Sovacool et al., 2014).3 As noted above, the majority of the U.S.
2  RETs adoption is not the only way to decrease GHGs in the electricity sector. Energy efficiency, for example, 
represents a potent and cost-competitive tool to lower electricity sector’s carbon footprint (EPA, 2009). However, in this
study we focus only on one technological solution to decarbonization – RETs. 
3  This is not say that RETs integration into the electric grid is only a matter of the increasingly favorable LCOE. 
Presently, if not coupled with storage, most commercially scalable RETs are considered non-dispatchable technologies 
(EIA, 2017). Because the existing electric grid was designed to accommodate dispatchable, centralized, and largely 
fossil fuel and nuclear generation, RETs proliferation in the existing grid is hampered by several technological and 
economic barriers. However, because of the largely distributed RETs application, these technologies show favorable 
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states require utilities to have a certain percentage of renewable power in their generation portfolios.
Therefore, in these states, reorienting a utility away from fossil fuels and towards RETs has become a
matter of both sustaining a company’s economic performance and legal compliance. 
2.2. Utility Executives, Agency Conflict Theory, and Path Dependence
Utilities that continue on the fossil fuel-heavy path risk engulfing themselves in the phenomenon 
known as path dependence. Also known as inertia, stickiness, and lock-in, path dependence in the 
simplest terms means that the ‘past determines the future’(Mahoney, 2000, p. 507). Puffert (2015) 
defines path dependence as follows:
Path dependence is the dependence of economic outcomes on the path of previous outcomes,
rather than simply on current conditions. In a path dependent process, "history matters" – it
has an enduring influence. Choices made on the basis of transitory conditions can persist
long after those conditions change. Thus, explanations of the outcomes of path-dependent
processes require looking at history, rather than simply at current conditions of technology,
preferences, and other factors that determine outcomes.
Perhaps the most recognizable form of path dependence in the energy sector (the most “uninteresting’ 
to Puffert) is known as sunk costs. This form is based on the longevity of capital-intensive 
infrastructure and equipment. Thus, according to Puffert (2015), “[o]bsolete, inferior equipment may 
remain in use because its fixed cost is already ‘sunk’ or paid for, while its variable costs are lower than 
the total costs of replacing it with a new generation of equipment.” The energy sector is prone to a sunk
cost and path dependence problem as exemplified by nuclear power plants with massive cost overruns 
(Grimston, 2005) or oil and gas projects that take nearly a quarter of a century to develop (Sidortsov, 
2012). The lengthy commission timelines, financing arrangements, and power purchase agreements, as 
well as legal and policy changes often make centralized, capital-intensive energy infrastructure obsolete
before the end of its useful life. 
Path dependence comes in more than one flavor. One of its most famous examples, the continuing use 
of the QWERTY computer keyboard layout, reveals a subtler pathway to inertia. Created for nineteenth
century typewriters based on advice from telegraph operators, the layout carried over to modern day 
computers, tablets, and smart phones despite being inferior to several alternatives. What is distinct 
about the keyboard example is that it crosses into the territory of personal path dependence, with 
billions of typists “wired” to the QWERTY layout (Mahoney, 2000). A similar type of dependence 
affects the people responsible for operating centralized, fossil fuel-based and nuclear-based energy 
infrastructure, including the people perched at the top of the command chain. In this sense, their 
behavior is “wired” to such infrastructure as they are contractually obligated and financially 
incentivized to ensure its continuous profitable operation. 
levelized avoided costs of electricity (LACE), a measure that shows generation technology’s value to the grid (EIA, 
2017). 
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It would be a gross overstatement to say that all electric utilities and executives that run them are averse
to decarbonizing their generation fleets. There are plenty of electric utility CEOs have acknowledged 
the inevitable energy transformation and have taken steps towards it. For example, Tom Fanning, the 
CEO of Southern Company, the second-largest utility in the United States stated that his company 
favors a balanced generation portfolio that includes RETs (Lacey, 2017). Even stronger support comes 
from the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), a trade association representing investor-owned electric 
utilities that provide service to 220 million customers in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia 
(EEI, 2017). David Owens, an Executive Vice President at the EEI pointed out the 25 percent reduction
in GHG emissions from the member utilities since 2005 through their commitment to RET proliferation
and grid enhancement (Lacey, 2017). However, technological, economic, and personal path dependence
premised on hundreds of GW of centralized fossil fuel-based and nuclear-based generation capacity 
may prove to be impossible to overcome even with the best intentions in mind. Therefore, finding ways
of breaching this formidable barrier remains highly important. 
Pursuant  to  the  agency  conflict  theory,  personal  incentives  might  serve  as  a  powerful  tool  for
overcoming or minimizing path dependence, including sunk costs. Agency conflict is the theory of how
an agent, (in the legal sense of this word), a CEO, for example, will manage a firm for which he or she
works,  but  does  not  own (Jensen  & Meckling,  1976;  Miller,  et  al.,  2002).  The  theory  states  that
executives of large, publically traded firms may not always act in furtherance of their companies’ best
interests if they do not directly benefit from the results (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Miller, et al., 2002).
In addition, because executive compensation responds asymmetrically to good and bad news, there are
incentives against disrupting the status quo, which may not be in the best interests of investors let alone
other  stakeholders  (Taylor,  2013).  Poorly  designed  incentives  can  encourage  counterproductive,
unethical, and potentially unlawful executive behavior (Biggerstaff, et al., 2014), which may have been
directly  influenced  by  what  Mayer  refers  to  as  ‘dark  money’ to  reduce  government  oversight  of
corporations (Mayer, 2016). Current compensation packages are intended to eliminate these conflicts
by promoting the growth of shareholders' wealth (Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970; Jensen & Murphy,
1990; Bizjak, et al., 1993). Simply exposing compensation values appears to have an effect. However,
the enactment of federal legislation limiting the deductibility of non-performance related compensation
and the adoption of mandatory enhanced disclosure of executive compensation by the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had measurable effect on executive compensation (Perry
& Zenner, 2001). 
Historically, executive compensation packages have been developed with the idea of minimizing the
agency conflict (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; 2005; Bebchuk, et al. 2011) and aligning corporate leadership
goals with those of stockholders (Agrawal, et al., 1991; Lanen & Larcker, 1992). In addition, there
have  been  proposals  to  align  executive  compensation  with  public  health  goals  (Pearce  and
Denkenberger,  2015).   It  is  reasonable  to  expect  company  executives  to  align  their  personal
compensation requirements with their company’s short-term performance without making fundamental
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changes  in  the  compensation  package  (Agrawal,  et  al.,  1991;  Lanen  & Larcker,  1992).  However,
combating  path  dependence—avoiding  or  minimizing  the  sunk  cost  problem  while  ultimately
increasing RETs proliferation and reducing carbon emissions—requires fundamental changes in the
ways utility executive compensation is structured. Below, we propose two such ways.
3. Data and Methods
3.1. The Case Study of Three Michigan Utilities
Michigan is the tenth most populous U.S. state. The state is a major electricity producer and consumer
placing 12th nationally in both categories (EIA, 2017a; EIA, 2014). Michigan is currently transitioning
from a  coal-heavy  generation  mix  towards  larger  shares  of  natural  gas  and non-hydro  RETs.  For
example, in 2014, coal-fired power plants provided half of electricity in the state. In 2016, this share
dropped to 36% (EIA, 2017a). Michigan is among 14 so-called restructured states (and the District of
Columbia) where some types of customers have the ability to purchase electricity directly from retail
electricity providers (RAP, 2011). 
The energy landscapes of U.S. states are unique in terms of the regulatory approaches, fuel mixes,
commitments  to  decarbonization,  and other  factors.  Michigan,  for  example,  finds  itself  among the
minority  of  the  states  that  opted  for  a  market-based  approach  to  electricity  pricing  for  certain
consumers (RAP, 2011). However, because of Michigan’s diversity of geography, economy, population,
generation mix, end uses, and regulatory approaches, the state is confronted with many energy policy
issues of nationwide relevance. For example, the aforementioned shift from coal-fired generation to
natural gas and renewables is in line with the trend observed in many U.S. states (Houser, et al., 2017).
Therefore, due to such representative characteristics, Michigan and its utilities provide an excellent
opportunity for a case study. 
We selected Michigan’s three of the largest utilities, DTE Electric, a subsidiary of DTE Energy (DTE),
Consumers (CMS) Energy (CMS), and Indiana Michigan Power, a subsidiary of American Electric
Power (AEP). DTE and CMS historically have been Michigan’s largest electric utilities (Howell, 2011)
whereas AEP historically has been one of the largest electric utilities in the United States (AEP, 2017a).
Therefore, because of these companies’ long-standing prominence in the state’s and national energy
landscapes,  DTE, CMX, and AEP have enduring corporate  culture while  displaying high potential
potential  for  carbon sunk cost.  DTE Electric  serves  2.2  million  customers  and has  the  generating
capacity of 11,084 MW (DTE, 2017a). CMS has 5,885 MW of generating capacity and serves 6.7
Michiganders (CMS Energy, 2017). Indiana Michigan Power’s market share of 128,426 customers in
Michigan is significantly lower than those of DTE Electric’s and CMS’s . Yet the AEP’s nation-wide
generating capacity of 26,000 MW supersedes the DTE Electric and CMS’s generating capacities by a
wide margin (Indiana Michigan Power, 2017). 
Because the overarching goal of our analysis was the level of personal path dependence and agency
conflict  at  the  top  of  the  corporate  command chain,  we chose  to  evaluate  parent  company CEOs
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compensation packages along with the GHG emissions that these companies produce. Unfortunately,
one or both types of data is not available for every Michigan utility. For that reason, we opted to focus
on the firms with significant carbon footprints that are required to disclose the GHG and executive
compensation data under environmental and securities laws. 
We obtained emissions data, measured in metric tons, from the EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
Large  Facilities  database  (EPA,  2016).  The  CEO  compensation  data  came  from  the  SEC;  more
specifically,  from  the  so-called  “Schedule  14A”  forms,  which  are  annual  proxy  statements  filed
pursuant to Section 14 (a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (SEC, 2016). In addition, we
used fuel source data reported by each utility itself (AEP, 2016; CMS, 2016; DTE, 2016).
3.2. Methods
Two approaches  were developed in order to provide incentives for utility  CEOs to decrease GHG
emissions directly or to increase RET deployment by altering their overall compensation with relation
to both GHG emissions and renewable fuel used. The effect of compensation based on emissions data,
where CGHG is the total compensation after incentives in U.S. dollars, and is given by:
CGHG ( t ) =SBase ( t )exp [ E0−E ( t )M 1 ( t ) ]
(1)
where  SBase is  base  salary  before  incentives,  E0 is  initial  emissions  in  kg/MWh  and  E(t)  is  final
emissions in kg/MWh.  M1(t) is a constant that can be changed to scale the effect of emissions on the
incentive pay. Both SBase and M1(t) can be modified to account for inflation among other factors unique
to a specific utility's business environment.
In the second approach CEO pay is related to the percent renewable fuel used and thus CRET is the
compensation after incentives:
CRET =SBase exp [ RM 2 ( t ) ] (2)
where M2(t) is a constant that can be changed to account for sensitivity or inflation,  R is the amount of
RETs used in the generation of electricity per utility in percent. Again, SBase can be scaled to account for
inflation. For both methods, SBase should be set at a value that allows CEOs a comfortable, but not
excessive lifestyle (Palia, 2000; Hadlock, et al., 2002). It should be pointed out that future work is
needed to determine what those values should be and if appropriate to adjust to meet other goals such
as those of ‘just sustainabilities’ (Agyeman, et al., 2003).
These approaches can both be used to provide a higher overall CEO compensation for firms that are
more environmentally conscious. In order to determine the impact of both methods with each chosen
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company, the data for all variables is examined for effects on overall compensation following equation
1 and 2.
For equation 1, the first method, E0 and E(t) and filled by using the emission data across one year
periods, 2012-2013 and 2013-2014, with E0 being the first of the two emission points. SBase is set at the
starting salary of the CEO for the given period. CGHG is then set at the current CEOs salary for the
examined calendar year, t. By doing this, M1 values can be determined for any firm and here it is done
for the three case study firms. 
For the second method, the R percentage is set using data for the specific year in question, t. SBase is the
same as it was for equation 1. CRET reflects the CEOs salary for year t. The constant M2 is calculated in
a similar manner as the calculation of M1. 
A sensitivity  study  is  then  used  to  probe  the  two  methods,  GHG emissions  or  renewable  energy
percentage,  to determine which is  more effective at  reaching the goal,  increased pay for CEOs of
environmentally conscious firms, over a range of constants. This is done by varying the constants over
static historical data, found from the proxy statements, the emissions data, and the RET data from the
published fuel mix of the utilities.
4. Results and Discussion
According  to  DTE’s  2016  Schedule  14A,  executive  compensation  consists  of  the  following  four
components:  base salary,  annual and long-term incentives,  pension and deferred compensation, and
post-termination agreements such as severance and change-in-control compensation. The annual and
long-term incentives are particularly important for DTE executives. For example, they comprised on
average 75% of DTE CEO’s total compensation in the fiscal years 2014, 2015, and 2016 (DTE p. 53,
2017). These incentives are “designed to tie compensation to performance and encourage executives to
align their interests with those of the shareholders and customers of the [c]ompany (DTE p. 41, 2017).
The  amount  of  compensation  is  determined  by  two  incentive  plans,  one  that  is  focused  on  the
company’s performance and another that tracks the performance of eligible executives. The former is
calculated  pursuant  to  a  rather  complex  formula  in  which  the  company’s  financial  performance
accounts for 50%, customer satisfaction for 16%, employee engagement for 8%, employee safety for
8%, and generation,  distribution,  and system reliability  for 18%.  (Ibid. p.  44).  The basic principle
behind DTE’s long-term compensation is to postpone its full vesting for three years. The long-term
incentives comprise performance shares and restricted stock, which reflect various aspects of DTE’s
financial performance. 
CMS’ 2016 Schedule 14A puts alignment of executive compensation with increasing shareholder value
as the top principle of its executive compensation program (CMS, p. 25 2017). To achieve that, the
company  employs  compensation  packages  consisting  of  a  base  salary,  annual,  and  long-term
incentives.  Similarly  to  DTE,  performance-based incentives  comprise  approximately  75% of  CMS
executives  compensation  packages  (CMS,  2017).  Although  CMS’  2016  Schedule  14A  boasts
9
Preprint: Cleyton M. Cavallaro, Joshua M. Pearce, and Roman Sidortsov, Decarbonizing the boardroom? Aligning electric utility executive compensation 
with climate change incentives. Energy Research & Social Science 37 (2018) pp. 153–162. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.09.036
company’s safety, reliability, and consumer cost achievements, both annual and long-term incentives
are based on CMS’ financial performance as measured by earnings per share, operating cash flow and
total shareholder return. Also similarly to DTE, “long-term” means that the compensation, in the CMS’
case performance- and tenure-based restricted stock, fully vests three years after the award date (Ibid.).
AEP’s use of incentives in executive compensation is even higher than that of DTE’s and CMS’. For
example, incentives comprised on average 85% of AEP CEO’s total compensation in the fiscal years
2014, 2015, and 2016 (AEP p. 48, 2017). Pursuant to AEP’s 2016 Schedule 14A, the company sees
both annual and long-term incentives as the main vehicle for aligning executives’ interests and efforts
with the AEP’s objectives. The long-term incentives are structurally similar to those offered by DTE
and CMS. The performance-based stock comprises 75% and tenure-based stock 25% of the long-term
incentive package. The incentives fully vest within 3 years of the initial award (AEP, 2017). 
What sets AEP apart from DTE and CMS is the structure of the company’s annual incentives, namely,
the inclusion of RETs adoption as a factor affecting executive compensation. The Schedule 14A lists
this  measure  under  the  Strategic  Initiatives  component  of  the  annual  incentive  compensation.  The
measure  is  based  on  the  “volume  of  new  projects  captured  by  AEP OnSite  Partners  and  AEP
Renewables,” the two AEP subsidiaries tasked with developing renewable energy projects (AEP, p. 36,
2017). 
However, this RETs adoption incentive appears to have very limited significance vis-à-vis the rest of
the incentive package. First, the annual incentive package is less than a half of the long-term incentive
one (AEP p.  48,  2017).  Second, the RETs adoption incentive accounts only for 2% of the annual
incentive performance score. In comparison, operating earnings per share accounts for 75%, safety for
10% and the  rest  of  the  Strategic  Initiatives  for  13% (AEP p.  36,  2017).  Third,  the  performance
minimum, target, and maximum goals are set at $0, $20, and $50 million in renewable start up projects
respectively. This is inexplicably low as AEP OnSite Partners and AEP Renewables delivered $299
million such projects in 2016 (Ibid.)
Whilst  we can mark the AEP’s initiative as a start  (albeit a timid one), the omission of renewable
energy or carbon emissions in relation to CMS and DTE executive performance is troubling. Not only
does  the  omission  contradict  the  aforementioned  generation  mix  trend,  it  does  not  reflect  the
requirement set forth by Michigan’s RPS. In addition, three years might be long-term in CEO years but
certainly not in capital-intensive energy infrastructure. Therefore, all three utilities can benefit from
reevaluating their executive compensation packages in light of inevitable energy transformation.
Data gathered on AEP, CMS Energy, and DTE Energy is presented in Figures 1-3, which show the
percentage of RET, GHG emissions, and total  CEO compensation, respectively.  These values were
used along with the equations 1 and 2 to calculate M values for each approach from each firm. By
calculating the M values,  it  can be determined how closely each firm currently follows the given
equations.
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The first method determines M1 values from equation 1. A lower M1 leads to higher compensation
increases for reductions in emissions. If the value is zero or negative, the variables have no effect on
CEO  pay.  By  setting  an  M1 value  that  will  give  CEOs  proportionally  increased  benefits  with  a
significant decrease in emissions, equation 1 can be used to determine the future CEO compensation
contracts that will benefit the general public by reducing GHG emissions.
The second method, which uses equation 2, determines the CEO compensation as a function of percent
of electricity generated using RETs. The higher the percent of renewable technology used, the higher
the overall pay will be. The closer a positive M2 value is to zero, the more of an effect RET incentives
have on CEO pay. 
By  optimizing  the  M values  for  both  equation  1  and  equation  2,  compensation  contracts  can  be
developed that encompass the need for RETs. The calculated M values are seen in Table 1 and 2. It was
found that AEPs CEO was not compensated with relation to the emissions.  In fact,  the CEO was
actually  compensated  more  when the  emissions  increased.  CMS Energy's  CEO compensation  was
strongly  related  to  emissions  and  DTE's  compensation  was  related  moderately  to  a  decrease  in
emissions. RET use is not given over a time period in equation 2, so it does not show correlations to
any firm.
In order to determine which approach fits best for each firm, a sensitivity study was performed. The
results of this sensitivity analysis can be seen in Figures 4-6 for the GHG emissions approach and
Figures 7-9 for the RET approach. These show the total increases in compensation for both equations
over the lifetime of the goal. That is, for equation 1, the total increase in compensation if the firm
reduces their total GHG emissions to zero. For equation 2, the total increase in compensation if the firm
uses 100% RETs is shown. These increases are given for various M values to help determine the best fit
for each firm.
For the first approach, a decrease in M1 corresponds to an increase in compensation. It can be seen in
Figures 4-6 that  an M1 of  approximately 5000 will  give a 100% increase in  compensation for the
various firms for a total elimination of emissions. These values can be used to help set a reasonable M 1
value to utilize equation 1 for individual firms.
Figures  7-9  show  how,  like  the  previous  approach,  decreases  in  the  M  value  will  correspond  to
increases in CEO pay. Unlike approach one, a value for M2 that gives a 100% increase in compensation
for complete adoption of RETs is about 1.2. Figures 4-9 help to visually show what effects various
constants will have on the pay of an electric utility CEO in Michigan.
Qualitative analysis of both equations can also help to determine the best fit. Method 1, emissions, may
give strong incentives for the CEO to quickly reduce emissions on all current generating plants. This
will help to promote a reduction in emissions on all non-renewable power sources. Method 2, RET, will
help  promote  long  term  renewable  energy  technology  increases.  CEOs  operating  under  the  RET
method will reduce their dependency on non-renewable generation. Over time, the effect will be to
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reduce both emissions and operating costs.
Both  equation  1  and  2  can  work  interchangeably.  This  is  shown in  Figure  10,  where  both  GHG
emissions and RET percentage are compared to CEO compensation. For this comparison, a base salary
of $10,000,000, starting emissions of 5,000 kg/MWh, and a starting RET percentage of 0% were used.
As a result of compensation for both GHG and RET being equal, an equation that encompasses both
previous  approaches  can  be  developed.  This  is  done  by  scaling  equation  1  and  2  to  appropriate
percentages, P1 and P2, of the desired influence, and adding them together. The resulting compensation
equation  allows  for  CEOs  to  receive  incentive  pay  for  both  reducing  their  overall  emissions  and
increasing their renewable generation. 
C=P1 [SBase ( t )exp [ E0−E (t )M 1 ( t ) ] ]+P2 [SBase exp[ RM2 (t ) ]]
(3)
Equation 3 has some key advantages over the previous two methods, which develop from allowing the
total  compensation  to  be  reliant  on both emissions  and renewable  energy technologies  in  variable
amounts. If a firm feels that from year to year their scope has changed, the board can easily modify the
percentages of each component that affect CEO pay. This allows for an obvious focus, reduction in
emissions or increase in renewable energy technologies, that the CEO must move towards in order to
achieve their highest possible pay. Equation 3 helps to encompass the entire goal of moving towards
cleaner energy into one simple equation.
One possible consequences of combining the first two approaches into a final, singular equation is a
confusion of constants. If the M1 and M2 values are not correctly chosen in equation 3, the equation can
modify the significance of one approach versus the other more than intended.  While  this  is  easily
solved, it can cause complications with the use of equation 3.
The limits in the scope of this study are that only three electric utility firms in a single U.S. state were
examined.  While  the case study possesses  representative characteristics  and it  reached the goal  of
developing useful approaches for providing utility executives with incentives that befit their companies
and general public, the study could be further verified if a broader range of data was collected. The
only sources of error found in this study were from the company data itself. That is, most companies
report their emissions data over different time periods (i.e. fiscal vs. normal year) or in different units.
While  these  were  all  correctly  standardized,  there  is  no  confirmation  from each  company  on  the
accuracy of  the  data.  Future  policy work would benefit  from a standardized  method of  emissions
reporting.
Future work can focus on examining many electric utility firms to determine optimal constant values
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for  implementation  of  these approaches.  This  approach could also be focused on examining other
industries (e.g. manufacturing, agriculture, mining, etc.) and determining if these sustainability based
executive compensation incentives can also work for using executive pay to improve environmental
performance in those sectors. If the approach quantified by equation 3 was deployed into use, it could
help align executive personal financial goals with environment objectives in a number of industries
with  environmental  challenges.  For  deployment  to  be  possible,  the  stability  of  this  equation  over
changing economic environments within the United States  and the global  economies must also be
examined  in  addition  to  the  optimal  constant  evaluation  and  differentiated  industry  evaluation
mentioned above. This method can be implemented either voluntarily or it can be used as an incentive
by regulators during permitting and/or rate proceedings. 
5. Conclusions
The need to better align executive compensation with global environmental objectives arises from both
internal and external reasons. Not only it is an environmentally-responsible thing to do considering
grave risks posed by climate change, it is a commercially-prudent thing to do in light of existential risks
to electric power utilities posed by the path dependence problem. At present,  two out of the three
largest Michigan utilities, DTE and CMX do not factor RETs adoption in structuring their executive
compensation despite the RETs adoption requirement under state law. AEP’s executive compensation
package includes a RET-driven incentive but this incentive appears lack significance in comparison to
the  remainder  of  the  executive  compensation  package.  While  the  AEP’s  RET-driven  incentive
represents  a  welcoming  start,  it  must  be  scaled  up  to  become  a  sufficient  inducement  for  AEP
executives to start  rerouting the company on to a path to meaningful decarbonization.   We see no
apparent reason why this type of incentives cannot be adopted by DTE and CMX as part of executive
compensation packages, provided these incentives are appropriately scaled. 
However, we caution against blindly copying incentive packages from one company to another. An
executive compensation package that works for a state or regional electric utility might not work for a
company operating nationally and vice versa. In fact a utility with presence in several states might have
a greater flexibility in where and when to phase out fossil fuel generation assets and roll out RET
facilities.  Therefore, we see studies of successful and unsuccessful executive compensation packages
featuring incentives for meeting environmental and social objectives as particularly fruitful avenues for
future work. Such studies have the potential  to contextualize the GHG and RET approach, or any
combination  thereof,  proposed  in  this  study  to  develop  executive  compensation  packages.   The
approaches  can  be  customized by modifying the  constants  in  the  combined equation  to  meet  any
requirements of an individual firm. In order to help prevent the harmful effects of GHG emissions,
executives of firms with significant emissions can be provided with incentives for a direct benefit to
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implementing  RETs,  and policy.  Additional  future  work  is  needed to  investigate  how this  can  be
effectively accomplished though CEO incentive pay in industries beyond electric utilities.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Percentage of fuel used in the generation of electricity from RETs for each firm.
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Figure 2. GHG emissions for each examined firm from 2012 to 2014.
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Figure 3. Total CEO compensation per year for each examined firm from 2012 to 2014.
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Figure 4. Change CEO pay per year for DTE Energy as a function of emissions for various M1 values.
28
Preprint: Cleyton M. Cavallaro, Joshua M. Pearce, and Roman Sidortsov, Decarbonizing the boardroom? Aligning electric utility executive compensation 
with climate change incentives. Energy Research & Social Science 37 (2018) pp. 153–162. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.09.036
Figure 5. Change CEO pay per year for CMS Energy as a function of emissions for various M1 values.
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Figure 6. Change CEO pay per year for AEP as a function of emissions for various M1 values.
Figure 7.  Change CEO pay per year for DTE Energy as a function of RETs used in fuel generation for
various M2 values.
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Figure 8. Change CEO pay per year for CMS Energy as a function of RETs used in fuel generation for
various M2 values.
Figure 9. Change CEO pay per year for AEP as a function of RETs used in fuel generation for various
M2 values.
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Figure 10. A comparison of both methods, assuming $10,000,000 base salary and 0% base emissions.
It shows that both methods are interchangeable.
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Table 1: Calculated M1 values for each company 
over one year periods.
Table 2: Calculated M2 values for each company 
over one year periods.
